

## **Objectivism and Subjectivism Concerning Moral Obligation**

According to *objectivism* about moral obligation, what we morally ought to do is determined by the actual state of the world. *Subjectivism*, on the other hand, claims that our obligations are determined by our *beliefs* about the world. We shall apply three adequacy conditions to the objectivism vs. subjectivism controversy. First, a plausible theory of moral obligation should be compatible with uncontroversial reasons to gather more information about the state of the world. Second, a plausible theory must account for the apparently close connection between acting wrongly and being blameworthy, as well as for considered beliefs about the possibility of moral luck. Third, a plausible theory should be action-guiding, or applicable by agents in situations of choice.

A preliminary result of our investigation is that objectivism satisfies the first condition, but does poorly as regards the second and third. Extant versions of subjectivism fare no better. Contrary to what previous investigators have argued, no version satisfies both of the first two conditions, and all remotely plausible versions have difficulty in satisfying condition three. However, we shall suggest a novel, “procedural” version of subjectivism, which shows greater promise of fulfilling the three adequacy conditions. Part of the project consists in refining and defending this form of subjectivism.