

Book Reviews

Hans-Peter Müller and Steffen Sigmund, eds., *Max Weber-Handbuch: Leben-Werk-Wirkung* (Stuttgart: Metzler, 2014), xi + 425 pp. (hbk). ISBN 978-3-476-02432-9. €59.95.

So, Max Weber, the great editor of and contributor to handbooks, now has one dedicated to him alone. Handbooks are usually subject specific – law, economics, politics – and their closest equivalent is the encyclopaedia. The difference with the latter, is that the handbook is more of a teaching aid, working from main definitional items to illustrative unpacking of the definitions. Open Chapter One of *Economy and Society* and the definitions are in large font followed by longer passages of explanatory illustration in a smaller font.

If in the conspectus of his academic knowledge we see Weber as an encyclopaedist, does this handbook represent a return to the Handbuch tradition in which Weber worked? In one sense this would be true to Weber. His mind gathered into itself material from a large array of specialisms and disciplinary approaches. What he did with this material presents as the problem of the oeuvre: what are its unities, what is its developmental logic, was it complete or left unfinished? But push back through to the Handbuch tradition of classification, and that material is re-indexed as an alphabetical list of his major concepts, or existing concepts he inflected through his own definition and usage.

This is a neat idea with obvious pedagogic advantage. What instructors and lecturers have the confidence, given the state of Max-Weberian scholarship, to tell their students to read *The Protestant Ethic and Spirit of Capitalism* and then such and such chapter in *Economy and Society*, ditto *General Economic History*. Instead, if students want to become Weber-literate, they need just work through the concepts; everything from Arbeit und Beruf, Beziehung, Bürgertum through to Wertsphären und Lebensordnungen, Wert(urteils)freiheit, and Wirtschaft. The scholarly editors and authors have done the heavy work and poured the relevant material from oeuvre into the receptacle of concept.

We can anticipate one problem with this approach. Take the first Begriff listed: Arbeit und Beruf. Weber's treatment of this in *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* has marked idiosyncrasies compared with his sociological exposition in Chapter Two of *Economy and Society*. This entry, penned by Hans-Peter Müller, takes up six columns, including a wider reading list. He dives into Chapter 2 of *Economy and Society* to argue, correctly in my view, that Weber's treatment of work and occupation has to be differentiated from the tradition of Adam Smith and Karl Marx and their use of the idea of the division of labour. The Henderson/Parsons English translation is blind to this, since Weber talks not of the division of labour (Arbeitsteilung) but of the distribution of performative work (Leistungsverteilung). (Performative here means output, the sweat of one's brow, not Searlian speech acts.) This leads to a further distinction between work that allocates (directing workers, directing slaves, etc.) and the work itself. Drawing out the implications of this for Anglo-readings of Weber cannot be gone into here, but they are not unimportant.

So we can have confidence in Müller's handling of Arbeit. What of Beruf? For Weber, in *Economy and Society*, this is tied uncontroversially to the notion of training, profession, and specialization as well as barriers to entry into a Beruf. Müller then cross-relates Beruf to the first Beruf, that of the magician. 'Magicwork', so to speak, involves the analytical sequence of performance – work – occupation; these have their comparative reference points in antiquity, the middle ages, and modernity. Accordingly we are referenced to the *Roman Agrarian History*, the *Agrarverhältnisse im Altertum*, and *Economy and Society (E&S)*.

This is all masterfully handled, but where does Protestant Beruf fit in? It gets only a glancing mention: the Puritan willed his own vocation (Berufsmensch) but in the contemporary world, as Weber puts it at the end of *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, we have no choice but to take up a professional occupation (Berufsmensch). The Protestant Ethic essay makes fairly free with sleights of hand concerning Beruf. This entry does not go into this. But on the basis of an extensive reading of Weber's text, Müller secures 'Leistung' as the meta-concept within which work can be stratified horizontally, as in a factory, and vertically in stratification: owner, professional, wage worker. Performative disposition of work can also capture today's flexible worker and de-skilling.

As can be guessed the entries are highly compressed. This works well for entries like Politik. Wolfgang Fach in two and half columns

gives us the essence of Weber's position: it is an elaborate machine-like competition for the practice of power and violence. *Augenmass* is the desired criterion of realism, leadership is the tendency to translate societally heterogeneous support into a uniform political following. This entry tends to but does not endorse a Schmittian reading.

Heiner Ganßmann's entry on *Geld* is especially good in disinterring highly relevant aspects of Weber's use of monetary theory, which for the most part lie buried in long expositions in *E&S*. Weber drew on two theories that today are seen as opposed to each other: the Austrian tradition that money is a commodity used to expedite market exchanges, and the chartalist school of Knapp that it is the sovereign state that creates money and imposes monetary order. The Eurozone crisis is analysable in precisely these terms: namely, the market theory of money was placed at the heart of the Euro project at the expense of the chartalist school, which holds that sovereign states have to retain the ultimate right to control the creation of money and who controls it. Ganßmann also suggests we need to return to Weber's account of the determination of market price as one of conflict and the seeking of advantage, particularly in the money market itself and what Weber termed its trader guilds.

The entry by Gert Albert on objectivity and ideal types is concise and reliable, Johannes Berger gets to the heart of Weber's sociology of capitalism and of economy, Hubert Treiber neatly presents *Recht*, Andreas Anter likewise on the state – to name just a few of the very capable authors. Hinnerk Bruhns outlines Weber's specific argument in 'The City' manuscript and its subsequent misreading as urban sociology. The occidental medieval city, with its exclusive legal, economic and administrative privileges – in contrast to the Asiatic city – is central to Weber's argument on the origins of modern capitalism. Steffen Sigmund outlines the main theses of the *Music* manuscript, asking why their uptake by musicologists has been so limited, but also pointing to the importance of rationalization of western music in identifying the peculiarities of occidental rationalism.

Part 3 of this publication flips from the *Handbuch* tradition to that of the *oeuvre*. Part 1, just to note, introduces the reader to the life and work of Max Weber, an obligatory but increasingly problematic *topos*. In Part 3 one fears a switch from active to passive pedagogy, as time-limited flexi students (no longer a *Beruf*) are fed expository accounts of the important texts. That said, what student or lecturer is going to wade through the cluster of texts on the economic and social history of Antiquity and the Middle Ages, which is

the first entry of Part 3. Particularly outstanding here is the contribution of Luigi Capogrossi Colognesi on *Roman Agrarian History*, one of Weber's more erratic texts, indeed barely comprehensible to the non-expert. To my mind the incomprehension under which this text has languished is due to its slightly thrown together structure which can only be understood in the surroundings of the juristic seminar. Colognesi points to its sheer, and unappreciated, originality in viewing the cardinal tenets of Roman civil law, those of property (*mancipatio, rei vindicatio, and usucapio*), not from the template of Roman law and all that it stood for, but from the conflict over property rights that Weber saw revealed in the archaeological discovery, in stone remnants, of Roman field surveys. What Weber had picked up on is that the surveys were of public land and this evidence showed a communal division of land, whereas the written record of Roman law was a much later codification that reflected the final triumph of private individual property in the late Republic. For Colognesi, this insight remains unsurpassed and the connection between land that was surveyed and its legal forms still remains an unresearched issue in classical studies.

Mateuz Stachura thematizes Hinduism as a form of traditional rationalism with karma not offering salvation from tribulation in this life but the escape from the transience of all existence. This belief feeds into the differentiated orders of economics, politics, the military, and the religious, which is subdivided both vertically and horizontally by castes and Beruf. The large Western question about the aggravations of ascriptive status do not register in a societal order built around normative inequality. The universality of Buddhism threatens the relativistic ethics of Hinduism, which are particular to the group identities of caste. In his entry on Buddhism Stachura neatly complements its failure to break through sociologically consolidated Hinduism, due to elite/virtuoso praxis of abnegation of everything connecting to the individual—a way to salvation that could not be sold to the masses. Peter Ghosh in his entry on ascetic Protestantism notes its world historical ranking through the incorporation of an ethical outlook in everyday life, something only achieved on the Indian sub-continent by Jainism, which never attained enough followers to rank as a world religion. Islam is not represented in the selection, Confucianism and ancient Judaism are.

Hubert Treiber's meticulous scholarship excels in his overview of the many volumes of Weber Letters published by the Max Weber

Gesamtausgabe. The range of topics Weber touches upon is extraordinary, as is the life as is the life, and the letters chart both the inner turbulence of the man himself and the external turbulence of the German state. One might say both man and state struggled to find the requisite forms to harness less dysfunctionally their enormous energy and spirit. We don't as yet have the letters from the youthful Weber, but Weber's life is marked by highpoints of amazing productivity where he is working and engaged in multiple fields, including personal ties; so, 1904–1905, 1912–1914, and 1917–1920. Treiber rather passes over Weber's raw intelligence, which was sometimes put to use manipulating people and outcomes, providing glosses for his own bad behaviour and, we should add, his excoriating anger. Weber remarks that the outcome of the First World War would determine the fate of German *Kultur*, which was eventually destroyed by the Third Reich. The Kaiserreich, while politically reactionary, was curiously energizing for the Bildungsmilieu of which Weber was such a prominent participant and leader. One of the urgent tasks of our day is to consider how academic freedom of opinion and university autonomy need to be embedded in a resilient intellectual and cultural milieu; pursuing the tinsel of international university league tables is not a Weberian legacy.

The expositions of *E&S* are divided between the fivefold division, made by the MWG, of the unrevised manuscripts (communities, religious communities, sociology of law, rulership, and the city) and the final 1919–1920 publication. On the latter, Jens Greve outlines clearly its systematic unities, and argues for its compatibility with the methodology and religion studies building to a free-standing theoretical edifice. A Weberian programme is quite able to hold its own against other theoretical schools.

Part 4 takes up contemporary themes. Here selected themes from social theory are interrogated via Weber. So we are presented with multiple modernities, bureaucracy as fate, the nation state in age of globalization and Europeanization, governmentality, secularization and disenchantment and so on.

The Handbuch, as *Leben – Werk – Wirkung*, must give Germanophone countries an advantage in the further development of Weberian social science. The Handbuch is the first textbook to make full and rigorous use of the almost completed Max Weber Gesamtausgabe. It opens up the enormous scholarship contained in the Gesamtausgabe, making it accessible and useable to the general academic community. English, Portuguese, Spanish, Japanese, and Chinese

scholars – to name the most prominent language groups – will need the Handbuch in furthering the next phase of Weber reception.

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Peter Ghosh, *Max Weber and the Protestant Ethic: Twin Histories* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), xviii + 402 pp. (hbk). ISBN 978-0-19-870252-8. £30.00.

Weber's study, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (PESC), is at its best on a first reading. Many of us can appreciate Mina Tobler's remark that she felt in the hands of a great personality and that she read it as a novel. The narrative of this 'novel' is the depiction of Puritan religious ethics, how they were incorporated into a lifestyle or conduct of life, and how they came to define the mentality of modern capitalism. The denouement of the novel arrives in the final pages when the modern impersonal capitalist cosmos is able to cast off completely its precipitating ethical origins, and the modern reader finds herself granted the individuality of personhood but with no way of influencing the machine-like nature of capitalism. Puritan asceticism, seemingly a most unlikely candidate, called the beast of modern capitalism into existence only to be devoured by its successive guises as utilitarianism, hedonism, cartelization, and even sporting achievement.

The first reading works because of the narrative drive and the rhetorical devices used by Weber. But when it comes to analyzing how the study was assembled, the text is perceived to be discontinuous. Puritanism is not one social/religious movement but composed of Calvinist predestinationist doctrine as variously taken up across Europe through synods, 16th century Pietism and Baptist sects in Germany, Methodism in late 18th century England, and – taking in the essay on the Protestant sects – American Baptist communities c. 1900. These are all separate episodes that illuminate the 'Protestant ethic', and Weber uses them in different ways to make the argument that they contributed to a spirit of capitalism that set economic man free of traditional constraints.

Peter Ghosh's treatment of the Protestant Ethic studies is the most analytical to date, and the discontinuous becomes a matter of studious dissection. Ghosh makes quite aggressive claims for the validity of his method of reading the texts, which is based on how a

historian, objectively, treats those texts in terms of their own history. Social scientists and economic historians, in contrast, use the Protestant Ethic studies for what they can get out of them, and that in turn is dependent on presentist debates. Ghosh also dismisses contemporary witnesses, like Marianne Weber and Karl Jaspers, as not having access to the truly private Weber, who discloses almost nothing to anyone about his aims other than in the text itself.

Peter Ghosh is curt and objectionable in his dismissal of Marianne Weber. She is a mere copyist and secretary to his writings and in her *Lebensbild* an unreliable guide to Weber's *Werkgeschichte*; for instance she had little notion of the studies on the economic ethics of the world religions, and she was rarely allowed to enter Weber's study. Jaspers had his own existential philosophy to promote and Jaspers' 'Weber' is part of that project. However this dismissal is itself open to historical scrutiny. In April 1913 Weber wrote to Marianne from Ascona and asked her to retrieve 'the manuscripts from the bank', which suggests that she was to a degree abreast with Weber's compositions. At the least Ghosh needs to engage more fully with Bärbel Meurer's biography of Marianne, whether he agrees or disagrees with her analysis. Marianne's *Ehefrau und Mutter in der Rechtsentwicklung* (1907) clearly belongs within the Max-Weberian intellectual universe. Ghosh is also unaware of the opinion of the late Rainer Lepsius who held that it was Karl Jaspers who wrote the exposition of the world religions in Marianne's *Lebensbild*. Between them, Marianne Weber and Karl Jaspers knew things about the construction of Weber's writings that are not to be dismissed as failing full textual knowledge.

These criticisms, one suspects, are mere quibbles for Ghosh, who demands an unencumbered reading of the textual evidence alone; *texta pura* one might say. His method in Part One of his book is to compare the writings and outlines of his lectures from the 1890s on 'General ("Theoretical") Economics', when Weber was teaching as an economist, with the 1904/5 study. As other scholars have noted, the Protestant Ethic study did not come out of a clear blue sky, it was a continuation of Weber's ruminations on the novel quality of modern acquisitive capitalism in contradistinction to more traditional forms of want satisfaction. Through a close textual analysis Ghosh pairs off the continuities, and is left with what the Protestant Ethic study brought new to the table.

Most interesting is the methodological novelty that Weber brought to the task. Lead academics, then, were expected to be personalities

speaking from strong value positions. Also political philosophies, notably liberalism, and religious affiliation were integral to academic discourse. Weber in his 1904 essay 'Objectivity' in the *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*, under its new co-editors, declared these positions to be value judgements and as such inadmissible. Politics, economics, and religion—all to be found in the *PESC* were to be handled in an impartial manner. Value freedom, says Ghosh, was a new form of secularized rationalism. Weber also introduced the idea that normative beliefs could be treated as an object of knowledge, even through—indeed by means of—empathetic construing of motives, beliefs, and behavior of those studied. Construing is Ghosh's translation of *Deutung*, which as we know became *verstehende Soziologie* in the 1913 'Categories' essay. Ghosh plumps for 'On Some Categories of a Sociology of Understanding' as his translation of the title of the essay. Since there can be a sociology of just about everything, this does not work as a title, but it is suggestive and one way to think about *verstehende Soziologie* is as a 'construing Sociology'.

Ghosh holds that the Protestant Ethic study belongs to *Wissenschaft*, period, and our social science with its mechanical application of research methods is failing to honour the legacy. Similarly the modern university insists on separating out humanities, natural science, and social science, thereby denying the academic community of knowledge. In not heeding the interdisciplinary sophistication exercised in the Protestant Ethic study, we are denying ourselves the ability to comprehend the valency of a whole culture.

What occupies Peter Ghosh is the lack of completion in the *PESC*. Weber said at the beginning he would supply the definition of modern capitalism at the conclusion of the study, but he did not. Ghosh sees this as Weber being undecided as to the extent of the role played by rationalism. By rationalism is meant Weber's own usage of the term apart from its French coinage by Descartes and Voltaire. This is the novel ingredient that Weber brings to the study of Puritan theology, the idea that there occurs a rationalization of salvation theology in formal and substantive terms. (Ghosh is prepared to pre-date formal and substantive rationality to *PESC* rather than its later elaboration by Weber in the 'Sociology of Law'.) Ascetic Protestantism is a product of rationalism. But the same goes for the development of capitalism, so is rationalism the key term in Weber's Protestant Ethic study and how do the pair, ascetic Protestantism and capitalist spirit fit together? Ghosh's answer is through the meta-concept of occidental *Kultur*.

Part Two of the book tracks the manifestations of the 1904/5 in Weber's subsequent works. This is stated not so much as a hypothesis as a tautology: '...because the *PE* was not just a religious-historical enquiry but a compressed introduction to the totality of Weber's intellectual universe, almost all his subsequent writings of whatever kind stand in a substantial relation to it. In particular this means the three major sociologies of *Herrschaft*, law, and religion that make up the bulk of the surviving drafts for "Economy and Society"' from 1910 onwards. Ghosh therefore argues that everything emanates from the intellectual feat of the Protestant Ethic study of 1904/5. Most Weber scholars chart the intellectual developments and challenges post-1905 as a heterogeneous expansion of Weber's intellectual repertoire. Ascetic Protestantism remains core to the fateful development of occidental *Kultur*, but quite why the massive expansion in Weber's civilizational horizon, represented by the Economic Ethics of the World Religions, has to be shrunk back to the 1904/5 study is a mystifying exercise in scholarly contrivance.

Ghosh objects to Friedrich Tenbruck's prioritizing Weber's project on comparative civilizations and the place of worldviews. Ghosh also objects to what he sees as Wolfgang Schluchter's downgrading of the PE study and the development of a macro-sociology able to handle the typologies of world rejection, world affirmation, world mastery, and world flight, and the different positive and negative soteriological goals. Both Tenbruck and Schluchter make full use of new process concepts that Weber introduces from around 1910 onwards; notable among these are rationalization, disenchantment, worldviews, differentiation of the spheres of life, and stratification. Rationalization as a dynamic societal process concept barely appears in the 1904/5 version. There are only three uses of the term, denoting the intellectual rationalization of religious belief. By contrast the 'Sociology of Music' study uses the term rationalization 43 times, according to Radkau; the range of knowledge objects to which rationalization is applied vastly increases and they include both material and ideal constructions. Ghosh simply ignores the Music study, unsurprisingly. Likewise a freestanding sociology of power is dismissed; Weber's political writings and sociology of state that so pre-occupied him from 1915 to 1920 are peripheral. The City manuscript is subjected by Ghosh to inconclusive dating but its substantive importance in the configuration of the origins of modern capitalism is ignored.

On one area that Ghosh should have made more of, in the light of his goal of hooking up the 1890s lectures on economy with the final version of 'Economy and Society', is Weber's economics. Ghosh, however, is not interested in the substantive sense of economics, or indeed of sociology, politics, and law; and the studies on Hinduism, Buddhism, and China degenerate, for him, into merely historical-empirical studies. He wishes only to use Weber's terminology as names to be placed in a chronological context of his own making. The continuity between 1890 and 1919–1920 is the problematic of capitalism and the causal explanation of how acquisitive capitalism came to define the modern economy and society. By 1920 the part of Protestant mentality in this explanation is greatly reduced, though its salience as *Kulturkritik*—the restless rationalism of occidental culture—remains. Ghosh's determination to foreground the *Kulturkritik* does not necessitate him perversely reducing the whole oeuvre to the 1904/1905 Protestant Ethic study. This is an artful reading of Weber, full of intellectual surprises, many of them alarming.

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Hartmann Tyrell, *'Religion' in der Soziologie Max Webers* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2014), liii + 357 pp. (hbk). ISBN 978-3-447-06888-8. €74.00.

One of the articles in this volume begins with the following quotation from the famous introduction to Weber's collected essays on the sociology of religion:

It is true that the path of human destiny [*Menschlichkeitsschicksale*] cannot but appal him who surveys a section of it. But he will do well to keep his small personal commentaries to himself, as one does at the sight of the sea or of majestic mountains, unless he knows himself to be called and gifted to give them expression in artistic or prophetic form.

Weber stressed the need for a distanced perspective and warned his readers not to indulge in dilettantism, intuition, and vision (*Schau*). Specialists could enter into long discussions about the merits of this translation,¹ but here I want to consider the way the passage is

1. Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, trans. Talcott Parsons (1930), with an introduction by Randall Collins (Los Angeles: Roxbury Publishing Company, 1996), p. 29.

examined by Hartmann Tyrell. The German original is quoted in his article on 'Religion and "Intellectual Reasonableness" [or honesty: *Redlichkeit*]', subtitled 'The Tragedy of Religion in the Thought of Max Weber and Friedrich Nietzsche'. The often subterranean influence of Nietzsche's thought in Weber's work is a common thread that runs through Tyrell's book.

Nowadays, Tyrell observes, a sociologist or historian might react to the pathos of Weber's admonition with curiosity about its meaning or function within his oeuvre. But Tyrell is not primarily interested in these issues. Instead, he tells his readers that he is interested in the following question: Which world-historical destinies or developments – such as the process of rationalization – made a profound impact on Weber? It is remarkable, according to Tyrell, that Weber was so strongly fascinated by the sometimes tragic destinies of religions. This is a topic that Tyrell wants to examine by addressing the relationship between religion and truth, especially as raised in Weber's famous lecture 'Science as a Vocation'.

Tyrell then follows with two 'specifications' (*Präzisierungen*) of his focus. The first reveals that the tragedy in the title of his essay refers to the rationalizing tendencies of religion that, in modern times, have led to its own impossibility, or perhaps more precisely, its own 'getting impossible' (*Verunmöglichung*). The German word is put between quotation marks without any further reference. The second 'specification' concerns the influence of Nietzsche on Weber's idea of the tragedy of religion. Here Tyrell points to Weber's later sociology, in which Russian influences are also to be noted. This last remark is not further explained here, as Tyrell moves on to a passage in Nietzsche's *Gay Science* about the 'victory of scientific atheism'.

The aim of the essay remains vague, and Tyrell's meandering way of presenting his thoughts makes it rather difficult to see what kind of conclusions – if any – he wants to convey. This is typical of the book as a whole. The articles collected in this volume are probably best seen as essays that explore and contextualize various themes and threads in Weber's work. In 'What Is the Protestant Ethic About?', Tyrell 'concludes' by remarking that Nietzsche and Marx are the 'gods in the background' of Weber's most famous work. Tyrell addresses topics such as 'the "religious" in Weber's sociology of religion', 'pessimism', 'the collision of values and Christian values', 'the religiosity of intellectuals', and 'the polytheism of values'. Again and again, Tyrell presents numerous quotations,

emphasizes phrases, puts them between brackets, and provides additional information and quotations in rich footnotes. It is a learned way of exposition, which is not per se unattractive, but rather hard to translate into a plainer idiom. One could claim some brilliance for Tyrell's formulations, but his encyclopaedic knowledge and heaping of quotation on quotation did not help me gain a much better understanding of Weber's thinking.

Most of the essays in this volume were originally published in the 1990s, and three appeared in 2000, 2001, and 2009. The contributions were not rewritten for this occasion, but are essentially presented in their original form. Some later articles on Weber that Tyrell has published are not included in the volume; it is not explained why they were omitted. Tyrell has added an introduction, which does not connect the essays collected in the book, but rather addresses a variety of subjects (intellectual contexts, 'the road to sociology', and the three forms of sociology that Marianne Weber distinguished in her husband's work) and discusses the views of other Weber specialists. Tyrell declares that his aim is not to evaluate Weber according to present-day standards, but to interpret his work in its contemporary context (x), hence the frequent references to Friedrich Nietzsche, Georg Simmel, Ernst Troeltsch, Emile Durkheim and others in his close readings.

Some articles do not take Max Weber as their primary subject. One contribution discusses the work of the nineteenth-century German theologian Friedrich Schleiermacher; another, written for a Festschrift in honour of the Bielefeld sociologist Franz-Xaver Kaufmann, deals with the semantic continuities and discontinuities in the ideal of Christian fraternity (*Brüderlichkeit*) over the ages.

Given Tyrell's digressive tendencies, it is a pity no index was included in the book. Perhaps he has simply shown too much respect for 'the sight of the sea or of majestic mountains' – that is, the torso of Max Weber's rich and multifaceted work – to come to hard and fast conclusions. The least one can say is that by reading these essays one gets a good taste of the many nuances and aspects of Weber's writings on religion.

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Uta Gerhardt, *Wirklichkeit(en): Soziologie und Geschichte* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2014), 432 pp. (pbk). ISBN 978-3-8487-1587-9. €79.00.

The title of Uta Gerhardt's book refers to reality in the plural, which is meant as an allusion to the program of humanistic (*geisteswissenschaftlich*) interpretive sociology. She sees the origin of this program in Georg Simmel's *The Problems of the Philosophy of History* (1892) and Max Weber's programmatic essay 'The "Objectivity" of Social Science and Social Policy' (1904). According to Gerhardt, both authors took a stand against the positivist conception of reality in their time. They argued that meaningful scientific knowledge in the social and historical sciences was always the result of a selection of the relevant parts of the phenomenon as seen by the author. Gerhardt sees Alfred Schütz as continuing the program of an interpretive sociology in his *Phenomenology of the Social World* (1932), which initially failed to catch on due to the circumstances of the time. As the fourth major point of orientation, Gerhardt mentions Talcott Parsons, who introduced this program on the North American continent with his famous book *The Structure of Social Action* (1937).

The twelve chapters of the book are located within this coordinate system. Regarding herself as 'the faithful successor' to those 'great classics', Gerhardt wants to 'bring their science of reality [*Wirklichkeitswissenschaft*] back to life today' (16). She applies it to a range of more recent phenomena in order to 'explore [...] what an interpretive analysis is able to achieve' (18). Most of the essays refer to—or are based on—her earlier work. The book itself is divided into four parts, each containing three texts: 'Society I: Social Life', 'Society II: Sociological Theory', 'History I: National Socialism', and 'History II: Transformation to Democracy after 1945'.

The first part of the book presents sociological approaches to understanding various social groups. In the first chapter, 'The German Family and Violence', Gerhardt describes two explanatory models in the field of sociology of the family, namely, the authoritarianism thesis and the anomie thesis. By making recourse to a text of Parsons's from the 1940s and its explicit distinction between 'the integrated (democratic, pluralistic) and the deviant (dictatorial, totalitarian) society' (39), she shows the similarities between authoritarianism and anomie as explanatory categories and thus the fertility of Parsons's theory. The second chapter, 'And that I get a pension...', treats the phenomenon of social aging from the perspective of medical sociology. Based on research data gathered as part of the author's 1987–1993 study of the

further careers of patients of open heart surgeries, Gerhardt argues that neither the course of treatment nor social status sufficiently explains a patient's decision to resume working life or go into early retirement. Rather, this decision can only be understood by investigating the patient's attitudes regarding social aging through interviews. In the third chapter, 'Expellees and Refugees Revisited', Gerhardt deals with the problem of integrating refugees in West Germany after the Second World War. Here she shows how theories of state integration (Schütz) and cultural integration (Simmel), despite all their merits, do not adequately address the problem, much less resolve it. Relying on an unpublished report of Parsons's, which dealt with the integration of African Americans, the author shows that integration only came about as a result of a newly defined 'societal community' (87) that constituted values agreeable to all the involved groups.

In the second part of the book, Gerhardt deals with various aspects of sociological theory. The fourth chapter, 'An Interpretive Social Science', is a description of Simmel's sociology. Gerhardt characterizes it as a methodologically sound, systematic, and humanistic approach that owes much to Dilthey's philosophy, which she regards as a response to the positivist theories of evolution in the nineteenth century. Gerhardt identifies three types of form analysis in Simmel's methodology: simple, logical, and process-related (109–16). The three 'sociological a priori' that make society possible, according to his transcendental perspective, are described as the overarching systematic prerequisites for his analyses of the forms of social life. The fifth chapter, 'Domination, Religion, Politics', is devoted to the 'fascinating charisma' (138) that Gerhardt believes has often been misinterpreted, even today, due to an unfortunate mingling of the concept and the phenomenon—for instance, when the concept was used in the 1920s and 1930s to justify the political role of a charismatic leader (138). She therefore attempts to understand charisma 'adequately' through Weber's works (142) and compares three different meanings of the concept in their respective contexts: the sociology of domination and sociology of law in *Economy and Society*, the sociology of religion, and Weber's political statements at the end of the First World War. In the sixth chapter, 'Personality and Social Process', Gerhardt describes Talcott Parsons's reception of Sigmund Freud's psychoanalysis. Her starting point is Adorno's critique of Parsons's theory of social systems, which she perceives as unjustified. Revisiting various sections of Parsons's work, she reconstructs the important role of psychoanalysis in his systems theory:

it enabled Parsons to relate social action and the personality of the individual; it allowed social change to be explained through psychoanalytic developmental models; and it even revealed a 'possible principle of social action' in democracies (174).

The third part presents Gerhardt's attempt to reintroduce social-psychological considerations into debates surrounding the widespread exertion and acceptance of violence in Nazi Germany. She contends that the German population's acquiescence in aggression against Jews and other minorities can itself be regarded as aggressive. In 'The Sociological Theory of National Socialist Domination', Gerhardt argues that an adequate sociological understanding of National Socialist domination can only be attained by combining Weber's theory of charismatic domination with Parsons's structural-functional perspective in *The Social System*. According to Gerhardt, the Holocaust and other atrocities must be seen as the outcomes of a social order that demanded constant proof (*Bewährung*) of its charismatic legitimacy—an interpretation that is corroborated by both Parsons's and Voegelin's interpretations of the religious elements in the charismatic order of Nazi Germany. In *The Social System* (1951), Parsons argued that 'compulsive conformity', a psychological mechanism that links frustration and aggression, functioned to stabilize regimes such as National Socialism. Gerhardt finds confirmation for this Parsonian concept in historical accounts of how immoral, murderous behavior was labeled as normal by the executioners of Nazi terror and the Holocaust. In 'The Intellectual World [*Geisteswelt*] of the Third Reich', Gerhardt reconstructs the Nazi German intellectual sphere with the aim of showing the extent to which the thoughts of its members could be characterized as irrational. Though *Mein Kampf* does not contain an explicit treatment of National Socialism as a revolutionary movement, its followers interpreted the *Machtergreifung* as a revolution against rational thinking. A totalitarian political structure or regime appeared to them as a remedy against the cultural pessimism that dominated their times. The irrationality of the regime is made clear by Hermann Rauschning, a former Nazi politician, who defected from the regime in 1938 and accused the Nazis of staging a 'Revolution of Nihilism'. Gerhardt shows how the Allies' efforts to establish a postwar order in Germany sought to respond to these cultural factors. Parsons, who was involved in this planning as an advisor, tried to promote a rational-legal order by dissolving the irrational idealism and belief in a hierarchical social structure which he deemed characteristic of the German political mind.

The last part of the book deals with efforts by the Allies to foster democratic structures in Germany after 1945. In 'Transatlantic Engagement: Parsons as an Expert on Germany During the Second World War', Gerhardt reconstructs three phases in Talcott Parsons's engagement with Germany and Nazism between 1937 and 1945. In the first phase, which lasted until 1940, he was mostly active as an author and commentator on Germany. After 1941, Germany and its future after the war became his main concerns. In the spring of 1944 he participated in a conference on postwar planning for Germany, and after the allied victory he served as an expert for the Foreign Economic Administration in Germany. The following article deals with 'The Concept of Democracy in Reeducation'. The text features a characterization of American discussions about the psychology of democracy during the early 1940s, the program of reeducation, and Weber's concept of rational-legal domination, which serves as a framework to explain the shift that occurred in the course of reeducation: a transition from a charismatic to a rational-legal order. Gerhardt briefly describes how the changes made by the United States government on the individual, state, and economic levels all fostered a rational-legal order instead of allegiance to a charismatic leader. The last article bears the provocative title 'Was National Socialism a Bad Idea?' and deals with the earliest social scientific research in Germany after the war. It was conducted by the Information Control Division of the American military government for the purpose of providing data to measure the advancement of reeducation and restructuring of the German population and political system. The data gathered between 1945 and 1949 suggest that the German population had renounced Nazism and embraced democratic norms of its own volition. After summarizing the results of the American survey questions and analysis, she attempts to show that they corresponded with Weber's notions of objectivity.

The book surveys a wide range of topics on which Gerhardt has worked over the years, some of which are highly relevant again today. The interested reader will find compact contributions to family sociology and the sociology of migration and medicine, as well as interpretations of sociological classics and discussions of important aspects of National Socialism and its consequences in Germany before and after 1945. However, taken as a whole, the book lacks the inner connection of its parts. Gerhardt's emphasis on humanistic sociology as an organizing theme is not convincing, since her application of theoretical concepts is often superficial. For instance, when

she treats the interaction of Simmel and Weber (131–32), she characterizes Simmel's transcendental excursus on the 'three a priori' as an answer to Weber's essay on 'objectivity'. She can only back up this claim by saying that Simmel does not contradict Weber explicitly. Gerhardt's claim to present an interpretive sociology is not in fact vindicated by the way she employs social scientific theory. Overall the connections between sociological accounts of National Socialism and historical interpretations remain loose and tentative. For instance her allusions to psychological concepts, instead of supporting a hermeneutical approach, at times have the opposite effect of prematurely cutting off an understanding of individual actions. This is the case when she states that the acquiescence to aggressive behavior on the part of the National Socialist regime can itself be regarded as aggressive. Here, Weber's crucial distinction between direct observational and explanatory understanding is irretrievably blurred by an a priori interpretation of meaning structures.² In these and other instances throughout the book, the humanistic framework which Gerhardt seeks to apply as an explanatory tool merely works as a loose descriptive context.

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Lawrence A. Scaff, *Weber and the Weberians* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 199 pp. (pbk). ISBN 978-1-137-00624-0. \$38.00.

What an incredible success: More than 150 years after his birthday, Max Weber counts as the greatest sociologist ever. He seems to have become the classic of the classics. But why? How did he accomplish this unique position on a global scale in a discipline that he—the jurist, economist, and historian—did not even particularly like? What is it that has made him so important until today?

Classics are made. Generations of social scientists need to read, interpret, criticize, and elaborate the oeuvre. In the case of Weber's premature death in 1920, this oeuvre had to be first edited and

2. See Max Weber, *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*, ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), p. 8.

published. At the beginning there was Marianne Weber, his wife, who devoted her life to creating an afterlife for her beloved husband. Others followed her, and now we are approaching the completion of the Max Weber Gesamtausgabe – his collected writings in 25 volumes, his letters in 11 volumes, and his lectures in 7 volumes. So it is time to take stock of the master and to ask what made this success possible.

This is the task Lawrence A. Scaff has set himself in his new book *Weber and the Weberians*. 'I am interested in the Weberian legacy as it was shaped over time. My subject is the reception of Weber's work, which is to say the reading, appropriation, elaboration, and critical extension of the thinker's ideas, concepts, methods, and approaches' (xiii). Scaff structures his argument about Weber's legacy in six chapters, which enables him to look at the people who made Weber a classic and to discuss his complex oeuvre and its impact on the social sciences. This organizational strategy works out beautifully. Scaff tells the story of 'the uses of Weber's ideas' (xiii), which makes the book an exercise in the history of ideas and a history of sociology itself. By embarking on the debates and discourses that revolved around Weber's work, he gives us lucid insights into theory building during the twentieth century. By illuminating the fierce discussions and struggles for or against Weber, his book can even be read as an introduction to social theory from a Weberian viewpoint.

The first chapter on 'Weber and His Legacy' introduces the groups of people who devoted their life to the reputation of Max Weber. At the outset, it was Marianne Weber, as well as his former students Siegmund Hellmann and Melchior Palyi, who edited the main writings in the 1920s. This laid the foundation for an oeuvre that would become available for distribution around the world. As Scaff has shown in greater detail in his pathbreaking book on *Max Weber in America* (2011), Weber soon went transatlantic and became an 'American' scholar with the help of translations by Frank Knight, Talcott Parsons, and Edward Shils. It was their interpretations which determined the picture of Weber as a social scientific scholar. A third group was formed by the host of émigré scholars, some of whom had gotten to know Weber personally. The most lasting legacy turned out to be the cooperation of Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills: their reader *From Max Weber* is still the most influential introduction in the Anglo-American world to the scholar and his writings. And as Scaff vividly shows (Table 1.3, p. 18), the process of translating Weber's complete works into English is far from finished.

The next four chapters turn to the substance of Weber's concepts and writings. In the second chapter, which takes Weber's most famous text—*The Protestant Ethic*—and the sociology of religion as its starting point, Scaff demonstrates that Weber is a master of cultural *and* historical analysis. Weber's value lies in his analysis of the historicity of culture and its impact, and a variety of scholars have followed his approach: Reinhard Bendix and Philip Gorski, Pierre Bourdieu and Clifford Geertz, and historical sociologists like Michael Mann, Theda Skocpol, and Steven Kalberg, to name but a few. Weber's theory of social action and domination, as Scaff demonstrates in the third chapter, inspired paradigms as different as rational choice theory and critical theory, the old and new institutionalism, and even structural functionalism and systems theory. The most vital legacy, however, pertains to 'Weber the institutional thinker'. How 'orders, structures, institutions' shape social and political life is convincingly developed in the fourth chapter. Scaff shows Weber's lasting impact on the study of state and bureaucracy, law and society, ethnicity and citizenship, race and nationality, and democracy and civil society. It was this comprehensive and complex take on the structures, institutions, and cultures of antiquity, the Middle Ages, and modernity that enabled Weber to delineate the rise of the West. Scaff's fifth chapter on 'Paths to the Modern World' takes up Weber's rationalization thesis and underlines its importance for civilizational analysis (Norbert Elias) as well as for the study of 'multiple modernities' (Shmuel Eisenstadt).

These four substantive chapters present a lucid reconstruction of Weber's contribution to sociology and outline the great potential of his work for future research. The secret of Weber's 'unusual staying power' (163) is his inexhaustible analytical potential, which is recognized by both adherents and opponents, as it transcends the borders of sociology and leaves its mark on the humanities and other social sciences. In the last chapter on 'Weberian Social Theory and the Future', Scaff points out that Weber's legacy consists neither in a general theory of society nor in the development of a paradigm, 'but rather [in] the investigation and explanation of specific social phenomena using the tools supplied by Weberian analysis: the development of appropriate "ideal types", the search for configurations in history, insistence on analysis that is multi-causal and multi-level, the use of models of rational action, awareness of conflicting conceptions of rationality, and attention paid to the social embeddedness of all kinds of institutions and practices' (167).

According to Scaff, Weber's heritage consists of four modes of analysis: structural, cultural, and institutional analysis, and the employment of rational actor models. The structural dimension refers to the social structure, or socioeconomic and sociotechnical environment, that determines the life chances of status groups and classes. The cultural dimension points to the meaning of phenomena and their relevance for people's conduct of life. The institutional dimension underlines the rules and regulations that determine the constraints for action. It is a pity that Scaff cites Douglas North but not M. Rainer Lepsius, who not only presented Weber as an institutional thinker but also contributed masterpieces of institutional analyses in a Weberian spirit. Finally, the models of rational action permit alternative courses of behavior to be gauged in terms of their 'irrationality,' i.e., as a deviation from an ideal-typically constructed mode of optimal action.

Max Weber was and is certainly more than a mainstream sociologist. For Karl Jaspers, he was *the* philosopher and the 'macro-anthropos of our world'. Weber is not only embedded in the canon of Western thinkers. He also makes us question what the turbulent social change around us means for the life conduct of modern human beings – an aspect of Weber's legacy that has been emphasized by Wilhelm Hennis as well as Scaff. This 'social-philosophical' side of Weber explains his attractiveness for critical theory, psychoanalysis, as well as late Foucauldianism, and remains today one of the most interesting avenues for future research in the social sciences.

Lawrence Scaff makes a strong case for 'Weber and the Weberians' as a centerpiece of sociology today. He has not only become a 'magister ludi' of Weberianism but is also well versed in the trends and tendencies, discourses and discussions in the social sciences of the twentieth century. This elegantly crafted and brilliant book is a must-read and *the* guide for Weber in the twenty-first century.

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Sven Eliaeson, Patricia Mindus, and Stephen P. Turner, eds., *Axel Hägerström and Modern Social Thought* (Oxford: Bardwell Press, 2014), ix + 461pp. (hbk). ISBN 978-1-905622-43-6. £150.00.

Axel Hägerström (1868–1939) is probably the greatest Swedish philosopher, keeping up with leading international standards, although

much more known in Sweden than abroad. He was influenced by Kant and Neo-Kantianism as well as Nietzsche, and paid attention to Marx, the German social democrat Eduard Bernstein, and the Austro-Marxist Victor Adler, but has become much more known as the founder of analytical philosophy in Sweden. He was one of many in the movement of cultural radicalism during the decades around 1900. His credo was the rejection of the belief in the objective existence of values. In his contribution to meta-ethics and philosophy of law he claimed that moral judgements cannot be true.

A frustrated academic opponent labelled him in the early 1930s a value nihilist, and this label became the accepted reference among both adherents and antagonists. In his legal-philosophical project he denied the existence of natural or objective law. The laws were expressions of power and material interests and changed with them. He contrasted the actually existing positive laws with the imagery of natural laws, which he argued were nothing but a construct reflecting social power relationships. Class interests determined the sense of justice. With his interest in values and the question of objectivity he quite obviously touched upon problems raised not only by Karl Marx but also by Max Weber.

Hägerström's rejection of objective morals and morality invited social protests against laws and norms. Moral indignation over experienced injustice was not based on thoughts about objective values, and it could generate political power which, in turn, would carry through into legislation and reforms. Although there were obvious points in common with Marx, there was a decisive difference on this point. Hägerström rejected Marx's conception of a kind of intrinsically objective developmental logic and criticized Marxism for its teleology.

The philosophy of Hägerström fits hand in glove with social democratic reformism. His legal philosophy legitimized the social democratic ideologues. He was a political radical himself, a specialist on Marx but not a Marxist. Hägerström represented what might be called a left version of the conservative German *Kathedersozialismus* with its arguments for an active state in social politics. His interpretative power went beyond the left spectrum of politics, however. Conservative thinkers had a hard time bypassing him even if they disagreed with him.

On the occasion of the centennial of Hägerström's inaugural lecture in philosophy at Uppsala University a symposium was organized there in September 2011. This edited volume collects the

contributions to that meeting. However, the volume is about more than just the commemoration of an event a century ago. In a time of European value crisis around the political shortcomings in dealing with the social question, Hägerström's views attract interest and provoke scholarly reassessment.

The volume has seventeen chapters organized in four sections after the introduction by the editors: I. Knowledge, Language, and Morals; II. Metaphysics, Neo-Kantianism, Religion; III. Scandinavian Legal Realism; IV. Hägerström's Legacy. It is a rich volume covering a wide range of perspectives on Hägerström. It presents him and his ideas to a broader European public with an interest in the issue of values. A brief review of the book cannot do justice to all the aspects and arguments of the book. Instead of proceeding mechanically chapter by chapter, this review will focus on a several key questions and debates that the book raises.

It is astonishing to what degree the academic debate on Hägerström's philosophy has cut him off from the 19th century philosophical debate on values, from Kant, from Nietzsche, and yes, also from Weber. Despite his cultural radicalism concerning questions about value nihilism during the decades around 1900, Hägerström has come to be associated with the field of post-1920 analytical philosophy. This was largely the work of the next generation of Uppsala philosophers, who, in the years after the Second World War, came to see him as the founder of a parallel movement to logical empiricism in Vienna and the Cambridge philosophy of Bertrand Russell and George Edward Moore. They depicted Hägerström as the great modernizer of philosophy in Sweden who abruptly broke with the idealistic tradition and established analytical philosophy. Some versions of this narrative argued that analytical philosophy emerged simultaneously but independently in Vienna, Cambridge, and Uppsala.

This story has been challenged over the past few decades. The debate on the nature and origin of analytical philosophy and its connection to philosophical thought before the era of the world wars is far from settled, and it seems clear that arguments about a clear break with nineteenth-century continental philosophy underestimate the complexity of the continuities and discontinuities. Johan Strang's chapter connects to this critical trend. His perspective is rather sociology of academic practices than the history of philosophical thought. His point of departure is the idea that theoretical doctrines are not the driving force of philosophical schools, even if they constitute their argument. He examines them as intellectual legacies

that are constantly redescribed, reinterpreted, and renamed in academic rhetorical-political power struggles in which their legacies can be claimed, abandoned, or lost. Struggles about academic positions and recognition underpinned the intellectual work on meaning. The idea of Hägerström as an analytical philosopher emerged only after his death in 1939 in the struggle over the interpretative power over his legacy. A group of younger philosophers, in particular Ingemar Hedenius, instrumentalized him in their struggle for historical and intellectual recognition. They reinterpreted Hägerström's philosophy in their attempt to establish and consolidate analytical-philosophical dominance in Swedish postwar philosophy in close connection with the trend in the same direction on the international scene. The two world wars delegitimized the historical role of continental/German philosophy and paved the way for an Anglo-American orientation with Cambridge as a centre of gravitation. The Vienna Circle of logical empiricism, and its search for general empiricist – rather than historical-contextual – criteria of meaning closed down in 1936. Ludwig Wittgenstein and Karl Popper were never formally members of the circle but were in close contact with it. Through their emigration and establishment in England, they represented continuity in this reorientation of philosophy in the wake of the world wars.

The distinction between analytical and continental philosophy was fundamental as an instrument for distinguishing friends from enemies in the academic and meritocratic struggles at the universities as well as in the broader public debate after 1945. These struggles separated serious philosophers from dilettantes, interesting intellectuals from irrelevant positivists. The aim of the winning side in the confrontation was not only to separate continental from analytical philosophy, but also the unscientific, metaphysical, and obscure from undogmatic reason based on facts. Hägerström served in the Swedish debate as a legitimizing founding father. Strang's convincing argument is that the philosophical landscape in which Hägerström worked before the Second World War was much more complex than what the postwar division between analytic and continental suggests. Many of the philosophers who today are regarded as the founders of the analytic tradition shared ideas, themes, and interests with philosophers whom we today associate with continental philosophy. The continental and analytical approaches were much more blurred than the clarity that the postwar reconstruction of meaning and legitimacy gave them. Strang's argument is not new. It has been built up during recent years. The

strength of the chapter is the argumentative clearness with which he epitomizes the trend.

Hans Ruin undermines the conventional understanding of Hägerström from another point of departure. He traces the genealogy of Hägerström's thought, which brings him to the question of its connection to Kant, Neo-Kantianism, and Nietzsche, i.e. the historical legacy on which Hägerström built his value philosophy. Ruin is searching for the historical context which was lost when the analytical divide was constructed. This historical context was still there in 1939, when Ernst Cassirer published his book *Axel Hägerström* in Swedish exile just before the analytical-philosophical appropriation of interpretative priority over the legacy of the cultural-radical philosopher began. Cassirer's points of reference in his portrait of Hägerström were Kant, Neo-Kantianism, and Husserl.

Ruin's approach connects him to Svante Nordin, who was the first scholar (1983) to confront the historical blindness that since the 1940s has characterized the domestic image of Hägerström. Nordin rejected attempts to tie Hägerström to the Cambridge School and the Vienna Circle. By emphasizing German idealism and the Neo-Kantian Marburg School in particular, Nordin took off where Cassirer left off. However, Ruin's point of reference is Nietzsche rather than Kant. He shows empirically by investigating key letters in Hägerström's correspondence how impressed Hägerström was by Nietzsche. Of course, the problem of nihilism was a key issue that unified them, not necessarily in agreement. Nihilism was for Nietzsche the sign of a profound crisis and a heavy threat, whereas for Hägerström it was a source of utopian hope. Despite this disagreement in their agreement, Ruin convincingly argues that Hägerström should be considered part of Nordic Nietzscheanism during the decades around 1900. Hägerström was not very explicit about his Nietzschean influence in his texts. This fact made it easier to appropriate Hägerström for the analytical school in the postwar reconstruction of philosophical orientation.

Georg Brandes introduced Nietzsche into the Nordic debate at the end of the 1880s, at a time when the production of the German philosopher had culminated in works such as *Beyond Good and Evil*, *The Genealogy of Morals*, *The Anti-Christ*, and *Twilight of the Idols*, before he disappeared into the silence of madness. Ruin relates Nietzsche's powerful impact in the Nordic countries from the late 1880s to a strong trend of cultural radicalism, directed in part against the strong legacy of the Lutheran state churches. For many Scandinavian poets

and thinkers, Nietzsche became the argument for breaking down the petrified conservative and Christian value structures that permeated academic, ecclesiastical, and public debate. Nietzsche contributed to the cultural-radical confrontation of the established order. Hägerström was a protagonist in the cultural-radical approach ever since the publication of *Stat och rätt* (State and Law) (1904), *Das Prinzip der Wissenschaft* (1908), and his inaugural lecture in 1911 on 'Om moraliska föreställningars sanning' (On the Truth of Moral Ideas), reprinted in English translation in the volume. However, existing studies of Nietzsche's influence on Nordic cultural-radical authors and philosophers rarely put Hägerström in connection with Nietzsche. It is Ruin's merit to have established this link.

Another underexplored question of connection deals with the value and objectivity philosophies of Hägerström and Weber. Sven Eliaeson takes up this challenge with Gunnar Myrdal as mediating tool. Eliaeson concludes that it is remarkable that very similar thoughts emerged simultaneously in different places, such as those of Hägerström and Weber, who knew about each other, though no real exchange took place between them. Gunnar Myrdal connected them in his writings about values and science a generation later, and made a kind of synthesis out of them. Eliaeson maintains that Hägerström was influenced by intellectual currents in England and Austria, but not by Weber, without commenting on the arguments in the chapters by Strang and Ruin. Against the backdrop of the chapter by Ruin, it is difficult to avoid the question whether not only Nietzsche but also Weber exerted an influence on Hägerström. The connections between Nietzsche and Weber are well documented.³ Though one should in principle be very careful with estimating the influences between individual authors and schools of thought, Ruin demonstrates in his chapter that it is possible to do so, and there might still be a gap in respect to the connections between Hägerström and Weber. It is in any case not sufficient just to dismiss this question with the argument that Hägerström belonged to the interest sphere of the analytical approach. Here one must emphasize that 'connection' does not necessarily connote one-way influence in an intellectually continuous chain of thought,

3. For the connections between Nietzsche and Weber, see Arpád Szokolczai, *Max Weber and Michel Foucault: Parallel Life-Works* (London: Routledge, 1998), pp. 38-82; and Georg Stauth, 'Nietzsche, Weber, and the Affirmative Sociology of Culture', *European Journal of Sociology* 33, no. 2 (1992): 219-47.

but might also mean confronting, opposing, overlapping with, or demarcating from, as much as drawing on.

This is a rich volume, which sheds historical light on a present that might be described as a European value crisis not without parallels to Axel Hägerström's time, when cultural radicalism tried to establish a new value scale to replace the collapsing norms of the old society. The volume maps in considerable detail the influences of Hägerström on his time, and the influences of his time on him. It describes and analyses the philosophical legacy of Hägerström and his thought, and demonstrates how Hägerström tried to understand the connections between values, norms, law, and politics in new ways. He was successful in breaking new ground, but the problems are still with us.

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