Uppsala Prints and Preprints in Philosophy

UPPSALA PRINTS AND PREPRINTS IN PHILOSOPHY is an in-house series for papers written by members of, or authors otherwise associated with, the Department of Philosophy, University of Uppsala. Such papers may be published later in a regular journal or book (“preprints”) or again may not (“prints”). The edition of preprints is always small; when regular publication takes place, if it does, remaining copies in this series are withdrawn.

The following prints or preprints have been published:


1. TOR SANDQVIST "An Inferentialist Interpretation of Classical Logic".


1. KAJ BØRGE HANSEN “Fast unification”


1. KAJ BØRGE HANSEN “Free will and operationalism”

2. ZALMA M. PUTERMAN “Marx’ syn på subjektiviteten”

3. KRISTER SEGERBERG “Axioms for a logic of actual knowledge”

4. KRISTER SEGERBERG“Deconstructing epistemic logic”

5. KRISTER SEGERBERG “DDL:a dynamic deontic logic”


1. BERISLAV ŽARNIĆ “Dynamic semantics, imperative logic and propositional attitudes”

2. KAJ BØRGE HANSEN “Essays 2002: logic and philosophy”

3. KRISTER SEGERBERG “Moore problems in full dynamic doxastic logic”

4. FREDERICK STOUTLAND “The belief-desire model of reasons for action”

5. KAJ BØRGE HANSEN “A study of König’s lemma”

6. KAJ BØRGE HANSEN “New definitions of the recursive functions”

7. KRISTER SEGERBERG “Some Meinong/Chisholm theses”

8. KRISTER SEGERBERG “Modellings for two types of actions”


1. TOR SANDQVIST  “Logica Chameleonica”

2. KAJ BØRGE HANSEN “Interpreting the quantum world”

3. KRISTER SEGERBERG ”Intension, intention”

4. THORSTEN JOHANSSON “Tractatus on the sublime and logical form”


1. KRISTER SEGERBERG “The lattice of basic modal logics”

2. JOHN BACON “Syllogistica Carolina rediviva”

3. TOR SANDQVIST “On why the best should always meet”

4. KAJ BØRGE HANSEN “Two paradoxes revisited”

5. KRISTER SEGERBERG “Outline of a logic of action” (Revised version 2001)

6. KRISTER SEGERBERG “A question about distribution”


1. The Goldblatt variations: eight papers in honour of Rob.

2. JACEK PASNICZEK “The logic of non-standard possible worlds”

3. JACEK PASNICZEK “Putting names and quantifiers into the same category in first-order logic”


1. KAJ BØRGE HANSEN “A noteon König’s Lemma”

2. KAJ BØRGE HANSEN “Recursion without the m-operator”

3. KRISTER SEGERBERG “On thereversibility of doxastic actions”

4. ERIK CARLSON “Two short papers on harm and value aggregation”

5. KAJ BØRGE HANSEN “Kanger’s ideas on non-well-founded sets: some remarks”

6. KRISTER SEGERBERG “Default logic as dynamic doxastic logic”


1. KAJ BØRGE HANSEN “Remarks on Gödel’s philosophy of mathematics”

2. STEN LINDSTRÖM “An exposition and development of Kanger’s early semantics for modal logic”

3. ERIK J. OLSSON and HENRIK SVENSSON “Disputation and change of belief: Burley's theory of obligationes as a theory of belief revision”

4. KAJ BØRGE HANSEN “The twin paradox without acceleration”

5. KRISTER SEGERBERG “Results, consequences, intentions:remarks on von Wright’s Norm and action, ch. III §5”

6. KRISTER SEGERBERG “Irrevocable belief revision in dynamic doxastic logic”

7. KRISTER SEGERBERG “Belief revision and doxastic commitment”

8. EDUARDO L. FERMÉ and SVEN OVE HANSSON “Selective revision”

9. YAROSLAV SHRAMKO “Semantics for constructive negations”


1. HENRIK SVENSSON “Jodocus Trutvetter on modal syllogistic”

2. HENRIK SVENSSON “John Buridan's modal syllogistic”

3. HENRIK SVENSSON “Early fourteenth century discussion of modal syllogistic”

4. KAJ BØRGE HANSEN “What is philosophy?”

5. KAJ BØRGE HANSEN “Logical rationalism: a programme”

6. KAJ BØRGE HANSEN “Proofs and examples in logic and geometry”

7. KAJ BØRGE HANSEN “Logical foundations of logic programming”

8. STEN LINDSTRÖM “Situations, truth and knowability—a situation-theoretic analysis of a paradox by Fitch”

9. KRISTER SEGERBERG “Two traditions in the logic of belief: bringing them together”

10. KRISTER SEGERBERG “A doxastic walk with Darwiche and Pearl”

11. KRISTER SEGERBERG “Three recipes for revision”

12. JOHN CANTWELL “Towards an analysis of the progressive”

13. JOHN CANTWELL “Some logics of iterated belief change”

14. KAJ BØRGE HANSEN “Topics in logic”

15. JOHN CANTWELL “Resolving conflicting information”

16. KAJ BØRGE HANSEN “Realism and causality in quantum mechanics”

17. KRISTER SEGERBERG “Belief revision without linearity”

18. The Parikh project:seven papers in honour of Rohit.


1. KRISTER SEGERBERG “A general framework for the logic of theory change”

2. JOHN CANTWELL and HENRIK SVENSSON “Resolving conflicting information”

3. KRISTER SEGERBERG “A festival of facts”

4. KAJ BØRGE HANSEN “On the foundations of logic”

5. KAJ BØRGE HANSEN “An analysis of the EPR argument”

6. KRISTER SEGERBERG “Some modal reduction theorems in autoepistemic logic”

7. SVEN OVE HANSSON and DAVID MAKINSON “Applying normative rules with restraint”

8. BRIAN F. CHELLAS and KRISTER SEGERBERG “Modal logics in the vicinity of S1”

9. SVEN OVE HANSSON and WLODEK RABINOWICZ (editors) "Logic for a change.Essays dedicated to Sten Lindström on the occasion of his fiftieth birthday".

10. SVEN OVE HANSSON “What is ceteris paribus preference?”

11. SVEN OVE HANSSON “Closure-invariant rationality postulates”

12. SVEN OVE HANSSON “Defining pseudo-science”

13. SVEN OVE HANSSON “Social choice with procedural preferences”

14. SVEN OVE HANSSON “Decision-making under great uncertainty”

15. SVEN OVE HANSSON “Semantic approaches to the revsision of propositional knowledge bases”

16. SVEN OVE HANSSON “Legal reasoning and potestative rules”

17. SVEN OVE HANSSON and MIKAEL JOHANNESSON “Decision-theoretic approaches to global climate change”

18. SVEN OVE HANSSON “But what should I do?”

19. SVEN OVE HANSSON “Situationist deontic logic”

20. SVEN OVE HANSSON “The interval maximin (intermin) decision rule”

21. GUSTAF ARRHENIUS and KRISTER BYKVIST “Future generations and interpersonal compensations: moral aspects of energy use"


1. KRISTER SEGERBERG “Trying to understand the logic of theory change in terms of modal logic”

2. KAJ BØRGE HANSEN “Russell’s antinomy and diagonalisation”

3. KAJ BØRGE HANSEN “An upward Skolem paradox”

4. KAJ BØRGE HANSEN “Some results on w-consistency”

5. WLODZIMIERZ RABINOWICZ and KRISTER SEGERBERG “Actual truth, possible knowledge”

6. JOHN CANTWELL “Comparatives”

7. ANNA GOMOLISKA “On the logic of acceptance and rejection”

8. KRISTER SEGERBERG “Delta logic and Brown’s logic of ability”

9. KRISTER SEGERBERG “Belief revision from the point of view of doxastic logic”'(Revised version 1995)

10. STEN LINDSTRÖM “A semantic approach to nonmonotonic reasoning:Inference operations and choice”


1. KRISTER SEGERBERG “The delta operator at three levels of analysis”

2. SVEN OVE HANSSON “Kernel contraction”

3. KAJ BØRGE HANSEN “Some derivations of Bell’s inequality”

4. JAN ODELSTAD “Vikter och vikt vid linjärkombination”

5. KRISTER SEGERBERG “Conditional action”

6. SVEN OVE HANSSON and ERIK OLSSON “Levi contractions and AGM contractions:a comparison”

7. SVEN OVE HANSSON “Changes in preference”

8. SVEN OVE HANSSON “Knowledge-level analysis of belief base operations”

9. SVEN OVE HANSSON “Belief revision and psychology”

10. SVEN OVE HANSSON “A test battery for rational database updating”

11. SVEN OVE HANSSON “Decision-theoretic foundations for rational preference”

12. SVEN OVE HANSSON “The emperor’s new clothes:some recurring problems in the formal analysis of counterfactuals”


1. KRISTER SEGERBERG “Newcomb’s problem:paradox or not?”

2. WLODZIMIERZ RABINOWICZ “Stable revision, or is preservation worth preserving?”

3. STEN LINDSTRÖM and WLODZIMIERZ RABINOWICZ “The Ramsey test revisited”(Revised version 1993)

4. KRISTER SEGERBERG “Perspectives on decisions”


1. JAN ODELSTAD “Taxiproblemet och det sannolikhetsteoretiska experiment-begreppet”

2. KRISTER SEGERBERG “Accepting failure in dynamic logic”

3. KRISTER SEGERBERG “How many logically constant actions are there?”

4. KRISTER SEGERBERG “Action incompleteness”

5. KAJ BØRGE HANSEN “An inverse of Bell’s theorem” (Revised version 1992)


1. STEN LINDSTRÖM and WLODZIMIERZ RABINOWICZ “Belief revision, epistemic conditionals and the Ramsey test”

2. STEN LINDSTRÖM and WLODZIMIERZ RABINOWICZ “Epistemic entrench-ment with incompatibilities and relational belief revision”

Last modified: 2022-01-01