Practical Philosophy

The Practical Philosophy Research Group presently includes the following researchers: Erik Carlson (professor), Jens Johansson (associate professor), Patricia Mindus (associate professor) and Folke Tersman (chair professor).

The research group also includes five doctoral students: Emil Andersson (Rawls’ concept of public reason), Karl Ekendahl (welfare and time), Magnus Jedenheim-Edling (issues regarding the concept of over-determination), Guilherme Marques Pedro (entry and exit asymmetry in international law), Victor Moberger (Mackie’s error theory), Sebastian Reyes Molina (non-epistemic features in evidence assessment), and Simon Rosenqvist (Utilitarianism).

Erik Carlson's main interests are axiology; normative ethics, especially consequentialism; free will and moral responsibility; and decision theory. He has also done research in metaphysics and epistemology. His publications include one book, Consequentialism Reconsidered (Kluwer, 1995), and he is the author of a large number (over 30) of papers in international peer-reviewed journals, as well as of many papers and reviews in other journals and collections. His most recent works include “The Small-Improvement Argument Rescued”, Philosophical Quarterly 61 (2011), “Non-Archimedean Extensive Measurement with Incomparability”, Mathematical Social Sciences 62 (2011), ““Generalized Extensive Measurement for Lexicographic Orders”, Journal of Mathematical Psychology 54 (2010), “Vagueness, Incomparability, and the Collapsing Principle”, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (2013), and “’Good’ in Terms of ‘Better’”, (Noûs, DOI: 10.1111/nous.12061).

Jens Johansson works mainly in metaphysics and ethics. He has a particular interest in areas that overlap both these fields, such as the philosophy of death, personal identity, philosophy of religion, and issues of well-being and time. His publications include, among other articles, “What is Animalism?”, Ratio (2007), “Non-Reductionism and Special Concern”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy (2007), “Kaufman’s Response to Lucretius”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly (2008), “Being and Betterness”, Utilitas (2010), and “Parfit on Fission”, Philosophical Studies (2010). He has also edited the volume Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Death, Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming (with B. Bradley and F. Feldman). His current research focuses on well-being (especially preferentialism) and philosophy of religion.

Patricia Mindus' main interest is in Political Theory and Philosophy of Law (areas of expertise include citizenship studies and EU law). She is currently President of the Swedish section of Internationale Vereinigung für Rechts und Sozialphilosophie (IVR). Author of the award-winning book A Real Mind. The Life and Work of Axel Hägerström (2009), her recent publications include The Legacy of John Austin’s Jurisprudence, together with Michael D.A. Freeman (2012), Cittadini e non (Firenze University Press 2014), Axel Hägerström and Modern Social Thought together with Stephen P. Turner and Sven Eliaeson (2014), as well as the edition of special issues in Legisprudence (2013:1) and German Law Journal (2014:5). She currently directs the research program Arbitrary Law-making in Today’s Citizenship and Border Control Policies, the Uppsala research network KUSKO, and the research program Civis Sum.

Folke Tersman was appointed chair professor in 2008 but has previously worked at Auckland University, New Zealand, Stockholm University and Gothenburg University. His main fields of interests are meta-ethics, epistemology, and philosophy of language. His recent publications include the book Moral Disagreement (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), which explores the meta-ethical implications of moral diversity. He continues to focus on issues regarding disagreement, both in ethics and in other philosophical areas, but also on certain meta-philosophical issues, regarding the role of intuitions in philosophical argumentation. Some recent outputs are “The Reliability of Moral Intuitions: A Challenge from Neuroscience”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2008), “The Case for a Mixed Verdict on Ethics and Epistemology”, Philosophical Topics (forthcoming), and “Disagreement—Ethics and Elsewhere”, Erkenntnis (forthcoming).